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The process of globalisation has gone through different phases of evolution since 
the 1960s and has affected different parts of the South differently during each phase.  
This paper starts with characteristics of the current phase of global regionalization and 
how it impacts economically on different parts of the developing world.  It explains 
what advantages and disadvantages the neo-liberal economic development approach 
hold for the South and how different parts of the South are responding to them.  It 
shows what challenges the lagging South face in its quest to reconnect to the global 
economy.  The paper then moves on to the concept of sustainable urban development 
and how the market could be made more accessible to large parts of the lagging urban 
South within the framework of sustainable development.  It analyses the current 
structure of the informal urban economic sector and demonstrates how vertical 
integration could be achieved between the formal and informal urban economic 
sectors in the urban South.  Finally it looks at different models of sustainable urban 
development and what consequences each holds for economic development in the 




















                                                           
1 This paper is partially drawn from a paper that was presented at a conference on globalisation that was held by the 
University of Southern California at the Rockefeller Foundation International Conference Centre, Bellagio, Italy on 
August 21, 2002. INTRODUCTION 
When one seriously considers the development trends in the urban South it is hard 
to find areas in which one could generalise because of the area’s great economic, 
social and cultural diversity.  Consequently, this chapter will begin by looking at the 
impact that globalisation had on the economic conditions in the South.  It identifies 
economic factors that have led to the phenomenon of global regionalization and the 
different roles regions in the South have been playing in global core-peripheral 
economic relationships over the past two decades.  It classifies developing countries 
into four groups and shows how global federalism has impacted on the way in which 
developing economies have been moulded over the past three decades.  Matters that 
will be addressed in this part of the chapter include:  regional economics, global 
competition in the developing world and demographic trends.  It will go on to discuss 
the impact of these factors on divisions of labour in the South and on migration 
trends.   
 
Looking at the urban South against the backdrop of global economic trends, the 
chapter secondly deals with the concept of economic growth and the limitations posed 
by human capital in the developing world on economic sustainability, environmental 
sustainable development and sustainable urbanization.  The chapter looks at how the 
market principle has to be adapted to tie in with current economic structures of the 
urban South.  It analyses the informal urban economic structure in the developing 
world and shows how elements of it can be reconciled with the traditional formal 
urban economic sector in the urban South.  Finally, it discusses different approaches 
to urban sustainability and ways in which urban development policies in the South can 
be reconciled with current options in urban sustainability. 
 
THE SOUTH IN GLOBAL TERMS 
Changing global divisions of labour 
Generally, globalisation is associated with the relative ease with which goods and 
information cross international boundary lines across the globe.  It integrates 
economies around the world and reduces social differences between nations.  The 
instantaneous transmission of images and information to once secluded corners of the 
globe causes the world to ‘shrink’.  A global localism is being created, and as a result, 
local views and behaviour are being influenced by people’s perceptions and behaviour 
elsewhere in the world (Cyr, 2001; Allen and Thompson, 1997; Harvey, 1989; 
Giddens, 1990).  The apparent decreasing differences in tastes and needs between 
nations increase market sizes and the interdependence between countries.  Although 
elements of globalisation or the extent of its impact have been questioned before 
(Beinart, 1997; Douglas and Wind, 1987), globalisation is by and large being regarded 
as a growing force in the development of economies all over the world.  The corporate 
world plays a key role in driving the process.  There is a rapid growth in offshore 
financial markets, an explosion in mergers and acquisitions, nationally and 
internationally, and all the time corporations are becoming less dependent on one 
nation’s economy alone (Emmerij, 1992). 
 
In the process the fragmented global economy of the cold war era is being replaced 
by a rapidly integrating global economy.  However, social and cultural differences 
between nations remain a limiting factor.  While global differences are often drawn in 
spatial-economic terms, the divide in social-cultural terms has become more marked 
in certain circles in recent years (Breathnach, 2000; Smith, 1995).  According to 
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by the process of globalization (Amin, 2001).  Resistance is consequently growing 
against the social, religious and economic influences of the West, particularly 
amongst Muslim and African nations.  Parts of the Muslin world visibly resist the 
growing global homogenisation, while sections of Africa accentuate the continent’s 
need to find its own ‘auto-centeredness’, its own cultural version of an African 
‘renaissance’ (Geyer, 2002; Tsheola, 2002; Sihlongonyane, 2001; Kaya, 2001).   
 
In the original global division of labour, manufacturing was concentrated in the 
core regions of the world while the periphery was lagging behind.  Up until the 1960s, 
core-peripheral relationships were largely exploitative – the North providing 
manufactured products to the South in exchange for primary products.  Towards the 
end of the 1960s globalization entered a new phase.  During this period of regional 
restructuring economic changes were brought about by global shifts in manufacturing.  
While the North maintained an advanced form of global corporate dominance 
(Graham, et al., 1988), production processes were selectively moved from high labour 
cost core areas to low-wage countries with quality labour and good infrastructure 
(Frobel et al., 1980; O’Loughlin, 1989).  This resulted in a new international division 
of labour, the dispersion of production processes from core areas to what Wallerstein 
(1974) calls semi-peripheral areas, causing the replication of core labour markets in 
such peripheral regions (Sassen, 1991).  In the process the global economic  space 
was transformed, from the original First, Second and Third World divide to one where 
distinct areas of growth in the Third World can be distinguished from the lagging 
Third World. 
    
Since the 1990s, the world has witnessed yet another wave of spatial economic 
changes.  After the demise of the Soviet Block, a new arrangement of political 
economic associations evolved.  The mixture of post- and neo-colonial relationships 
that were forged during the 1960s, which resulted in what appeared to be a 
fragmented arrangement of economic relationships between core and peripheral 
regions (Poon, 1997), are now becoming a more organized arrangement of economic 
super blocks.  On the one hand there are the more-or-less clearly defined core-
peripheral divisions of the Pacific Rim centring around Japan, the Americas around 
the United States, and Central and Western Europe around the Anglo-Franco-German 
core (Emmerij, 1992; Vernon, 1996; Lipietz, 1997).  On the other hand, a new 
underlying strategic residual force seems to be emerging, causing (members of) the 
Russian Federation, the Middle East/North African bloc and Central Asia, to be 
slowly gravitating towards one another.  Links between the potential members of this 
emerging block are still tentative, very loose and unstructured.  Some associations are 
of a historic political, religious, and/or cultural nature, others are based on similar 
resources and natural conditions, and others on strategic global geo-political interests.  
In the process a new global division is being created.  It consists of: (i) the core 
regions in the North that contain most of the head quarters of enterprises with a global 
reach, (ii) the inner periphery consisting of the newly industrialized countries of South 
East Asia and the ‘near-industrialized’ or ‘transitional’ economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and China, and (iii) the outer periphery.  The latter, 
which consists of ‘middle and low’ income countries (Arnold, 1997) can be loosely 
subdivided into three groups: (i) Third World countries such as South Africa and 
Botswana, (ii) Fourth World countries such as Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Uganda, 
and (iii) the Fifth World countries such as Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, and 
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environmental stress, over population, crime, and the erosion of borders (Shaw, 
1994).    
 
Policies that caused economic change  
The current phenomenon of global regionalization has been brought about by a 
whole sequence of fundamental policy changes in the developed world over the post-
Second World War period.  First, the financial control structures that were brought 
about by the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War were 
beginning to be dismantled during the late-1960s and 1970s.  In the process capital 
became increasingly liberated while the First World cities lost their manufacturing 
industries.  New York lost 35 per cent of its manufacturing employment in the 1970s 
and London around two-thirds over a slightly longer period (Harris, 1995).   
Increasingly, transnational companies started to locate in what is now known as 
‘newly industrializing countries’ because production costs were lower there and the 
investment climate in those countries was more accommodating (Chan, 1996).  This 
was a period characterised by a change in the structure of industry, from monopoly 
capitalism to flexible accumulation, and from a nation-state focus to a transnational 
focus in capitalism (Robinson, 1996; O’Loughlin, 1989).  Locally, privatisation of 
public institutions started to gain popularity, but it was only during the 1980s that the 
process really gained momentum.   
 
In response to the recessions of the early- and late-1970s the developing world 
resorted to protectionism in order to protect its local businesses.  In their drive 
towards greater financial independence from colonial powers, many developing 
nations resorted to policies of subsidised and uncompetitive import substitution.  In a 
climate of protectionism some domestic industries flourished, many of them operating 
at well below minimum efficient scale.  State controlled regulation and planning 
became a regular feature in those economies.  As a result of insufficient monitoring 
measures and control, debt in the developing world escalated (Roberts, 1978).   
Although the increasing number of debt reschedulings over the past twenty years 
(Callaghy, 1997) shows that debt is still a major inhibiting economic factor in the 
developing world, some of these countries have started to reverse their protectionist 
policies since the late-1980s.  They are now beginning to turn to more liberal policies 
of less government control and market driven economies focussed on the promotion 
of export industries (Bhagwati, 1997; Black and Mitchell, 2002; Harris, 1995).   
According to Kim (2001) this is a clear indication of the reality of global ‘economic’ 
and ‘political determinism’.   
 
The impact of foreign direct investment  
The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) is a very commonly used parameter for 
the measurement of economic relations between nations.  FDI is usually affected by 
the political and institutional stability, and demand, supply and cost conditions in a 
country.  Due to less favourable trade-offs between the potential returns on 
investments and direct and indirect cost factors such as restricting tax, tariff, quota 
and surcharge structures, developing countries are generally not as popular as 
investment destinations, as the developed world.  It is therefore not surprising that, for 
many years, more FDI has been flowing to the North than to the South, and that the 
proportion that has flowed to the North has been increasing relative to the South (Cyr, 
2001; Allen and Thompson, 1997).  In 1967, 67 per cent of the world’s FDI stock was 
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of the 1990s the FDI stock in the US alone exceeded that of the entire developing 
world, while the stock in the UK exceeded that of Asia (Koechlin, 1995).  Since the 
latter part of the 1990s the situation has changed somewhat, however.  During the 
period, overseas development assistance (ODA) for the South stood at around $50-55 
billion, while FDI increased from $25 billion to around $200 billion (Holliday, et al. 
2002).  In 1997 the developing world received approximately 42 per cent of all FDI 
(Loots, 2002).  Most of it has been flowing to the Pacific Rim, Central Europe and 
Central and South America, however, which makes FDI regionally biased, and 
‘invested interests’ and ‘cooperating competition’ important factors in globalisation.   
 
Part of the reason why most FDI still flows to the developed world while the bulk 
of the remainder flows to a relatively small selection of developing countries in the 
inner periphery is because comparative advantages remain a major factor in 
international trade (Poon, 1997).  Contrary to the past when comparative advantages 
were largely interpreted in terms of the availability of natural endowments at a 
particular location, it is increasingly becoming a strategically constructed 
phenomenon through industrial targeting and networking (Vernon, 1996).   
Transaction costs are another restricting factor in the dissemination of goods and 
services, despite decreasing friction of distance, especially in the exchange of 
information.  It is still in the interest of transactors to move to areas where 
agglomeration advantages exist (Parr, 2002) and where incidents of transactions are 
globally higher (Storper and Scott, 1995) while transportation costs are kept low.   
Intra-industry trade, i.e. the internalising of markets trough vertical integration, is the 
third important factor that contributes to DFI convergence.  A fourth factor is the 
concentration of high quality labour in the North and in parts of the South.  The 
current high performance global economy requires high order thinking skills and the 
North and the Pacific Rim have been able to attract significant amounts of FDI 
because they have invested massively in education over many years.  This has boosted 
their economic performances, while the inward looking economic policies of 
(especially) Sub-Saharan Africa and its low quality of labour have made it a high risk 
area for investment (Marshal, 1995).  Africa’s share in the world population, for 
instance, increased from around 9.7 per cent in 1970 to almost 13 per cent in 2000, its 
GDP declined from around 3.4 to 2.3 per cent, its exports from a little under 5 to 2 per 
cent, and its FDI from 5.75 to 1 per cent over the same period (OECD, 2002).  This is 
a clear indication how disconnected Africa has become from the rest of the world 
economy over the years. 
 
However, the importance of FDI as a development factor should not be 
overestimated.  In reality it usually only forms a relatively small percentage of 
domestic investment in developed countries, i.e. around 5 per cent from 1960 to 1991 
(Koechlin, 1995).  Also, FDI as a percentage of local investment overall does not 
seem to be increasing dramatically over time.  According to Bairoch (Beinart, 1997), 
as a percentage of GDP, FDI of the developed world in 1914 and 1993 was roughly 
on the same level, i.e. approximately 11 per cent, while FDI inflows of the world as a 
whole stood at 2.2 per cent in 1998 (World Bank, 2000).   
 
Mega cities of the South  
As a result of the economic changes that have occurred across the globe over the 
past five decades, major shifts in global urbanisation have also occurred over the 
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around 8 million at the time, while the populations of large cities in the South such as 
Buenos Aires, Sâo Paulo, Mexico City, and Cairo varied between 1.5 and 5 million 
(Merriam, 1962).  Since then, the world’s gravity point in mega city development has 
shifted dramatically towards the developing world.  In 1984, thirty-four cities had 
populations greater than five million, only nine of them were cities in the developed 
world (Fox, 1984).  Of all the people who lived in cities with populations greater than 
5 million in 1950, more than 50 per cent were Europeans and Americans.  Today, less 
than a quarter of the people in such cities are from those regions, and it is expected 
that this percentage will decrease to around 10 per cent over the next decade.  South 
America and Asia, especially India, China and parts of the Pacific Rim are all 
experiencing urban explosions, and based on the current low levels of urbanization in 
low-income countries, especially Africa (see Tables 1 and 2) there is a great potential 
that this explosion of the urban South could continue well into the twenty first 
century. 
 
Table 1  Population and urban growth in Africa    
 
Total pop(mil.)  Av/ann/grwth    Urban pop     Av/ann/grwth
      % of total       % of total        % of urban 
  1980(1990)2000  80(90)2000     80(90)2000       80(90)2000 
Sub-Sahara 380.7(508.3)659.8 2.9(2.9)2.7 23.0(28.1)34.5      5.0(5.0)4.8 
North    88.4(114.1)138.0  2.6(2.6)2.0  44.6(49.2)53.9      3.5(3.6)2.9 
All    469.1(622.4)797.8  2.8(2.9)2.6  27.1(32.0)37.9      4.5(4.6)4.3 
(World Bank, 2002) 
 
Table 2  Urban population growth in global regions 
 
Countries   Pop    Pop         Pop        Urban Pop     % Pop in  % Pop in 
   1980    1998        Growth       % of total      prim city   cities>1m. 
     (mil.)   (mil.)  80-98(98-2015)     70(80)98        80(95)   80(95)15 
 
Low income   2,527    3,536       1.9(1.3)          18(22)30        13(13)  7(10)13 
Middle income 1,114   1,474       1.6(1.0)          49(56)65        22(21)   18(22)24 
High income   789      886        0.6(0.3)          73(75)77        17(17)   30(32)33 
 
E Asia/Pacific  1,398    1,817       1.5(0.8)          19(22)34        12(9)   9(12)15 
C/E Eur C Asia  426      475        0.6(0.1)          52(59)66        15(15)   14(16)18 
L Amr. / Carib    360      502        1.8(1.3)          57(65)75        27(25)   24(28)28 
N Afr / M East   174      286        2.8(1.8)          41(48)57        31(27)   17(21)24 
S Asia      903    1,305       2.0(1.5)          19(22)28        9(11)  6(10)13 
S-Sahara     381      627        2.8(2.2)          19(23)33        28(29)  5(8)12 
(World Bank, 2000) 
 
However, the economic growth in the South had not been nearly as dramatic as the 
population shift over the same period.  Low-income economies are still largely 
agricultural driven and their per capita income have remained low (Table 3). In fact, 
apart from cities that are very well endowed by natural resources, such as cities near 
oil fields in the Middle East, only the economies of a relatively small number of cities 
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result of the world-wide shift in post-Fordist manufacturing.  In recent years, 
however, more DFI has been flowing from developed countries to developing 
countries nearby them than before.  In the process, countries in the Pacific Rim are 
now becoming stronger spatio-economically associated with Japan, Central Europe 
with Western Europe, and Central America with the USA.  Mega cities in the Pacific 
Rim that form part of the ‘flying geese’, manage to attract industries that are no longer 
viable in the South East Asian urban core (Marcotullio, 2001), while cities such as 
Mexico and those to the north of it benefited significantly from NAFTA.  Cities in the 
global outer periphery has been lagging behind ever since. 
 
Table 3  Size of the economies of global regions 
 
Countries(‘98)  GNP  97-8  GNP/c    97-8  GPP   GNP/c    Agri-labour 
          T r a d e  
      1998  %  1998    %  1998      % of        % of  
            l a b o u r   G D P  
      (Bn$)  ($)                ($)     70(90)  70(98) 
 
Low income    1,842    3.5  520     1.8       2,170      75(68)  12(46) 
Middle income  4,401    -0.1  2,990  -1.3      5,990      40(28)  30(56) 
High income    22,592   1.4   25,480   0.9  23,420     11(5)  29(44) 
 
E Asia/Pacific   1,802   -1.5  990   -2.6  3,280      76(68)  24(75) 
C/E Eur C Asia  1,044   -0.4  2,200   -0.5  5,510      33(23)  --(71) 
L Amr. / Carib   1,933    2.1  3,860   0.5  6,340      41(25)  20(32) 
N Afr / M East  581    3.7  2,030  1.6  4,630      50(35)  --(53) 
S Asia     560    5.7  430      3.7  1,940      71(63)  12(29) 
S-Sahara    323    2.2  510  -0.4  1,440      78(68)  47(59) 
(World Bank, 2000) 
 
For this reason the mega cities of the South play significantly different roles as 
global players compared to mega cities in the North.  Global and world cities in the 
North serve as apexes in the networks of urban systems in the globalizing economy, 
while cities in the South are facing significant disadvantages.  The distinguishing 
trademark of global cities is their ability to attract skilled labour and high value-added 
activities with a global reach.  They are globally recognised nodes of creative 
thinking, innovation, information, fashion and culture, which provide specialized 
expertise and services and house multinational companies and substantial sources of 
investment capital.  They act as the ‘command and control centres’ of the global 
economy (Sassen 1991; 1997; Knox, 1994; Beaverstock, et al., 1999).  Despite 
attempts to find a more comprehensive theoretical framework for the understanding of 
the concept of global cities, such as understanding it in the context of larger networks 
of globalized urban centres (Smith and Timberlake, 1995; Jones, 2002, Geyer, 1998) 
global cities continue to be distinguished from other centres in terms of the number of 
command and control functions that are located in them.  As a consequence, mega 
cities in the South and North are often analysed on equal terms.  
 
There are several reasons why this approach to mega city research is inappropriate 
for mega city analysis in the South (Geyer, 2003).  One is the fact that the spotlight 
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multinationals, the number of Furtune 500-firms located in mega cities, and the 
amount of FDI that is attracted by them.  In the process a wide range of issues related 
to the impact of globalization on layers of less economic sophistication in such cities 
tends to be blurred out.  An economic picture is portrayed in which the ‘techno-
literati’ of the world (Golding, 1996) take centre-stage in an exclusive economic 
environment, while a large percentage of the ‘techno-illiterati’ that live in the 
‘information-ghettos’ of the world (cities) is being marginalized.  Globalisation not 
only impacts directly on the survival of the lagging economies of the inner and outer 
peripheral regions of the world, it also impacts directly on the marginal sector inside 
mega cities (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Graham, 1999; Graham and Marvin, 1996; 
Warf, 2000; Geyer, 2002).  Just as the global competitiveness of global core regions 
leads to an increase in global underdevelopment in certain global peripheral regions at 
the macro scale, globalisation also tends to cause an increase in inequality and 
polarization at the micro urban scale, both in the developed and developing world.  
According to Sassen (1991) it causes a middle-classlessness in those societies, the 
proliferation of highly skilled professions followed by the ‘casualization’ and 
‘informalization’ of a wide range of other economic activities.   This leads to 
hourglass-shaped urban economies in the North (Hamnett, 1996) and pear-shaped 
mega city economies in the South.  
 
Considering differences in the cityness of cities in advanced countries in the West 
compared to those in advanced and developing countries outside the West, the 
question should be asked how universally acceptable the application of Western 
definitions of cities are outside the West (King, 1997; Robinson, 2002).  Based upon 
this, the question could further be asked how applicable global city rosters are when 
they are compiled in terms of narrowly selected ranges of criteria.  Linked to this, 
difficulties arise when global city rosters are compiled while disregarding the fact that 
global cities in advanced countries are by and large embedded in larger core regions 
of equal if not greater cumulative global significance.  These cities and extensive 
urbanised regions around them have become spatially integrated to such an extent, 
that, what holds true for individual global cities in terms of capital accumulation and 
access to markets and resources globally, also holds true for the urban networks 
around them.  In contrast, stand-alone mega cities (some of them emerging global 
cities) in developing countries are often embedded in economically less developed 
areas with comparatively scarce infrastructure and skilled labour (Geyer, 1998).   
These areas are unable to provide significant support to the modern economic 
activities that are clustered in the mega cities.  As a result they cause a steep decline in 
global significance with increasing distance from the apex of such emerging global 
cities in contrast to global cities in global core regions that enjoy significant economic 
support from associated urban agglomerations in their vicinity. 
 
From an international development perspective, core regions in the North are not 
the only areas that are advantaged by international economic forces of cumulative 
causation.   Emerging global cities in the South present similar advantages to 
prospective multi-national developers, albeit at lower levels of intensity and scale than 
those in the North.   They serve as popular FDI destinations with agglomeration 
advantages far outstripping those of other areas in their vicinity.  Serving as gateways 
to large economically less developed regions in the developing world, certain 
strategically located cities in the South have already become nodes of global 
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or have the potential to become such nodes in the future (Geyer, 1998).  Just like their 
counterparts in the North, these nodes in the South also attract large numbers of 
international migrants, most of them usually unskilled and originating from the 
region.   Scores of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa migrate to South Africa, many 
of them ending up in the inner urban areas of the country’s mega cities.  Similarly, a 
sizable proportion of the people from Asia and the Pacific Rim migrate to cities such 
as Singapore (Alden, 1996), and people in South America to the large urban 
agglomerations in that region.  Those that can compete for employment migrate to 
countries in the North.  These two migration streams are indicative of the process of 
international differential urbanization (Geyer, 1998), i.e. higher qualified migrants 
trying to find a new life in the North, while less qualified labourers who cannot make 
it to the North migrate from more remote peripheral areas of the South to the most 
vibrant cities in the region (Geyer, 2003).  
 
Closely associated with the problem of global block formation and the role that 
mega cities in the South play as migration and FDI destinations in their regions, is the 
problem of choosing the most appropriate economic development approach. 
 
DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS OF THE PAST 
Neo-liberalism 
Opposing views on whether the emphasis in economic development should fall on 
local or the export industry, are not new.  Soon after the Second World War ended the 
debate intensified on the potential of the ‘basic’ or ‘urban building’ versus the ‘non-
basic’ or ‘urban serving’ sector to bring about economic growth (Alexander, 1954; 
North, 1955; Tiebout, 1963; Leven, 1966).  Since then the intensity of the debate on 
the development of the South has not diminished at all, only the focus has slightly 
shifted.  This is clearly demonstrated by the way in which the advantages and 
disadvantages of neo-liberal economic development policies are still being debated in 
the literature.  As a result of the successes that were recorded by the newly 
industrialized countries of the Pacific Rim over the past three decades in attracting 
FDI and creating economic growth through industrial development, the established 
global network of big business and international funding organizations still by and 
large regards the main elements of neo-liberalism as the most appropriate way of 
achieving economic development.   
 
Proponents of neo-liberalism support the expansion of a social responsible free 
market system and the stimulation of private initiative. First, they believe that the 
reduction in financial control measures paves the way to foreign direct investments.  
Protectionism, they argue, does not breed competitiveness and is not conducive to the 
improvement in productivity levels in the local businesses sector.  Indications are that 
when markets are opened, the range of products broadens, the quality of products 
tends to improve overall, and with it also labour productivity.  Second, because not all 
public services are always provided efficiently by the public sector, proponents of 
neo-liberal economics believe that, ideally, the privatisation of most public services 
would result in more effective management of public services and create a climate 
that is conducive to growth of the private enterprise.  When privatisation involves the 
selling of public assets it also serves as a symbolic countermove against the growth of 
government.  However, due to high management costs to make assets sellable and the 
usual capital market thinness that characterises developing economies, their payoff is 
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domestic demand would reduce imports and generally improve balance of payment 
conditions in countries.  Ways in which this can be achieved is by allowing the price 
of basic goods and services to rise through the elimination of subsidies and by 
tightening interest rates.  Fourth, they believe that increasing exports would earn the 
necessary foreign exchange for such countries to pay off their debt.  Exports are 
normally stimulated when hurdles to the inflow of FDI, such as tariffs, quotas and 
surcharges are removed.  Finally, they believe that, in the long term, education and 
training produce a more productive labour force (Lipschutz, 1991).   
 
Within this development framework, a country’s institutional setup, its natural 
resource base, and the quality of its labour force which allows it to meet ever 
changing technology and skills requirements are key factors that determine the 
country’s ability to compete in the international market.  The OECD has been 
working hard to develop capabilities to conduct objective and accurate industrial 
development policy benchmarks.  They include: R&D infrastructure, educational 
profiles of labour forces, corporate governance structures, employment regulations, 
labour costs, taxation, and energy and telecommunication infrastructure (United 
Nations, 1999).  Although attempts are now being made by the lagging South to 
create a more attractive economic environment for international investments (see 
NEPAD, 2001) many countries in this part of the South still have a long way to go 
before reasonable international competitiveness becomes a reality (Geyer, 2003). 
 
Criticism of the lagging South 
Critics of neo-economic liberalism, on the other hand, believe that the approach 
has not delivered the desired results.  Despite faster gains in income and life 
expectancy and literacy improvements in low- and middle-income countries compared 
to high-income countries, the ratio of the average income of the richest to the poorest 
country in the world has increased from 30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 today (MMSD, 2002).  
Worldwide the inequality in wealth and power is growing.  According to Robinson 
(1996: 22) this amounts to permanent ‘structural violence’ against the world’s 
majority.   People in the South who have no access to health, clean water and 
sanitation and who live in poverty count in the billions. The population of the region 
grows exponentially because more then eight out of ten new births now occur in the 
developing world (Alden, 1997).   
 
These critics believe that a number of factors associated with economic neo-
liberalism keep on marginalizing lagging economies (Amin, 2001; Sihlongonyane, 
2001; Tsheola, 2002; Lipschutz, 1991; Kaya, 2001).  The first is the fact that poor 
countries have accumulated heavy debt burdens over time and the burden is growing 
all the time.  Debt often exceeds the capabilities of marginalized countries to 
overcome them in the near term, resulting in endless cycles of debt refinancing and a 
continuing flow of capital from developing countries to pay off debt to industrialized 
countries.  Second, there is a continued emphasis on the exporting of products that do 
not have large markets, or whose markets are declining in economically advanced 
countries.  In many cases there is not enough specialization in export products 
between developing countries, resulting in the oversupply of certain product lines and 
consequently the depressing of prices of those products on the international market.  
Although the focus on the export market tends to improve competitiveness and 
productivity locally, the urban poor in developing countries do not necessarily benefit 
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production processes have to be internationally competitive, hence the shift in focus, 
normally, from labour-intensive to capital-intensive production processes.  In the 
process the lowly skilled labour force looses ground, the labour force becomes 
stratified and inequity deepens (Aguilar, 1997).   
 
There are often indirect side effects to the sequence of depressing factors at the 
local urban level.  First, excessive premature urbanization often occurs in developing 
countries.  When too many people migrate to large urban agglomerations in lagging 
countries that do not have the ability to successfully compete for employment in the 
urban market, over-urbanization occurs.  Large numbers of such people often live in 
squalid conditions with little hope that they will ever be able to improve their lot 
significantly over the short term under current economic conditions (Mukherji, 2002).  
However, compared to rural poverty in developing countries, indicators generally are 
that urban poverty seems to be the lesser of the two evils. 
 
As the urban population becomes stratified, high-wage workers with a national and 
international orientation operate within the formal urban economic environment, 
while the lowly skilled workers lag behind (Aguilar, 1997).  Due to increasing capital 
mobility, massive shifts in capital could occur over a relatively short period of time 
within the urban South when urban decay sets in.  Because cities are the most 
dynamic component of the space economy of the developing world (Harris, 1997), 
such shifts in capital could have devastating effects on cities or parts of cities.   
Business closures could occur causing crises in urban labour markets there.  This has 
happened in many of the metropolitan and intermediate-sized cities of South Africa in 
recent years.  Soon after the political transition, black migrants started infiltrating 
parts of central areas of major cities.  This infiltration was accompanied by the 
invasion of those areas by the informal economic sector, followed by an increase in 
crime and urban decay and the subsequent relocation of formal businesses to areas 
where conditions are more conducive to formal business activities (Geyer, 2003).   
 
MAKING MARKETS WORK IN THE SOUTH 
Pillars in the Southern economic markets 
As was stated before, the focus in the neo-liberal economic development approach 
is on economic growth by means of procuring appropriate technology, increasing 
labour productivity, creating investment opportunities by removing obstacles of 
industrial development and international trade, and mobilizing capital.  This approach 
has been constantly criticized by the lagging South (Kaya, 2001), because many 
developing nations in Africa and South America have been lagging behind in 
economic terms, and are continuously losing ground, despite the successes that have 
been achieved with neo-liberalism in the Pacific Rim over the last four decades.  To 
overcome deprivation in the South more and more voices have been going up for 
sustainable development (Hall, 1996).  With this development framework in mind, the 
emphasis is shifting from conventional neo-liberal economic thinking as the principle 
vehicle to bring about economic growth, to ways in which new global market 
principles could be used to complement the economic strengths of the South.  Two 
issues are of importance in this regard.  First, how neo-liberal economics could be 
adapted to suit the circumstances of the lagging global periphery.  Second, how 
elements of the new flexible global economic environment, in which capital can shift 
from one production branch to another and from factory production to informal 
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in the South. 
 
From a corporate perspective two groups of factors impact on sustainable 
development.  Making markets work for all is one of the key principles in the creation 
of wealth and life improvement.  Well-structured, open, and competitive markets that 
take cognisance of inequities, inaccessiblilities, and injustices are still one of the best 
ways of advancing economically lagging communities.  The correlation between 
national scores on the Index of Economic Freedom and the Human Development 
Index clearly shows that governments that try to fulfil the role of the private sector 
keep their citizens poor (Holliday, et al., 2002).  One sure way of prolonging 
inequities globally is by maintaining protectionist policies, especially in the North.  At 
the same time, liberated and unobstructed markets do not guarantee accessibility to 
all.  To make it work for all, especially in the South, lagging groups should be allowed 
easier access than before.  Equitable markets create wealth, increase competition, 
foster innovation, create creativity and ultimately improve people’s quality of life.  
Creating streamlined, equitable and accessible markets is the responsibility of both the 
private and the public sector. 
 
Second, the financial and political regimes of developing economies are equally 
important in creating a sound economic environment in which business can prosper 
because FDI tends to flow to areas where investments are safe, where labour is 
productive, and where trade-distortions and financial obstacles are the least.  The 
marginal South does not have a particularly good record in this regard.  However, 
more FDI is also not a short-term solution because foreign investment has a long-term 
horizon and is often of the kind that is unlikely to provide sufficient employment to 
the unskilled and semiskilled masses in the cities to radically change conditions for 
them.  Creating a business environment that will accommodate the entire labour force 
of the South remains a challenge.  This implies that the urban South will have to learn 
to live with an economic dichotomy, i.e. a formal sector that normally does not 
sufficiently provide employment to a large component of the lowly skilled members 
of the labour force, and the informal sector that seems to be the only viable option for 
a large percentage of the latter.  Reducing the gap between the formal and informal 
sectors and building partnerships between the two sectors in order to increase the 
ability of the urban populations of the South to improve their living standard, should 
be strived for all the time. 
 
Building new market structures in the urban South 
One of the reasons why the urban South is struggling socially and economically is 
because there are much more inappropriately qualified people living in the cities than 
their formal economies can carry.  Providing employment to large numbers of people 
who cannot compete for jobs in the informal sector becomes a constant struggle.  To 
put the scale of the problem in context, roughly one million jobs have to be created to 
keep pace with rising urban populations in Central Latin America alone.  In 
comparison, two million jobs were created in the United States per annum as long ago 
as the 1970s, and that in an economy 15 time greater than the combined economies of 
the region at the time (Fox, 1984).   
 
As was said before, creating a new Southern blend of market economy may offer 
new hope.  In countries with long traditions of informal urban activities, smaller 
  12enterprises and independent formal and informal producers are often linked to large 
domestic firms and even multinationals (Aguilar, 1997; Geyer, 1988; 1989).  One area 
in which Southern urban markets could be exploited more vigorously lies in (i) 
recognizing the inherent structure of the informal urban sector, (ii) expanding and 
exploiting certain elements of it, and (iii) finding ways in which linkages between the 
formal and informal urban sectors could be maximized to the benefit of Southern 
economic society as a whole.  One of the reasons why many of the unskilled people, 
who migrate from rural areas to overcrowded cities in the South, enter the informal 
urban market is because entering it normally does not require skills, especially at the 
entry level.  However, over-exploitation of the informal economic sector in the urban 
South resulting in large numbers of vendors offering similar goods of similar quality 
at the same location, and at cutthroat prices, leaving most of them with barely enough 
income to survive, is a persisting problem (Penouil, 1981).  On the other hand, the 
formal economic sectors of the urban South, especially those in the deep periphery of 
the globe not only have to battle against the odds in the global market place, they also 
often have to cope with growing tax demands of capital hungry local governments to 
foot their swelling social overhead bills, as well as informal activities that often 
undermine their viability (Brown and Connell, 1993).  As a result of a combination of 
these factors the emphasis in the lagging developing countries of the world 




Indications are that the small and informal business sector in the urban South is 
becoming more stratified (Figure 2).   Traditional informal economic activities, i.e. 
activities with a large local cultural content, such as local traditional medicine 
practices, the selling of traditional cuisine, the manufacturing of traditional household 
goods and equipment, form the lower stratum of the structure.  The largest proportion 
of demand for goods and products in this category lies in urban areas where local 
population groups are concentrated.  The transitional informal economic layer 
contains businesses that provide goods and services that have some traditional 
  13features but are adapted to incorporate more advanced elements and techniques, such 
as the structured multiplied or even mass production of (stylized) traditional arts and 
crafts, or the production of modern household goods produced from locally obtained 
materials.  While the largest market for this kind of product lies in the central business 
areas of cities, their production processes occur in industrial areas and even at home.  
The upper semi-formal layer consists of the selling of goods and services that are 
obtained from the formal sector, or that are privately produced from materials that are 
obtained from the formal sector.  The products and services that are offered in this 
layer could range greatly in terms of their level of technical sophistication, from 
locally manufactured goods produced for local consumption only, to products that are 
marketed globally.  Although upstream and downstream linkages are sometimes 
found between the formal sector and each of the three informal strata, the linkages 
between the formal and the semi-formal sectors are often the most promising for 
immediate exploitation and expansion.  
    
 
The model also allows for international links with the local formal and informal 
sectors.  Deteriorating conditions in the South often result in an increase in emigration 
to the North, legally or clandestine (Morris, 1997).  Although this phenomenon holds 
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holds potential for an increase in international remittances because expatriates tend to 
keep in contact with locals (Afshar, 1998).  Initially, remittances are mostly of a 
financial nature but over the longer run the proportion of remittances in kind often 
tends to increase (Brown and Connell, 1993).  Potentially, this holds benefits for both 
the initial remitter and the benefactor, especially when remittances in kind become a 
two-way stream, i.e. when products from developed countries are sold by the 
benefactor in developing countries and vice versa, to the benefit of both parties.   
 
This model (Figure 1 and 2) provides a comprehensive framework that enables one 
to conceptually integrate the entire range of formal and informal activities in the urban 
South (and North), from the smallest to the largest, and from the traditional to the 
most sophisticated businesses.  It enables one to mix formal and informal economic 
activities under different development conditions in the urban South within a new 
market framework. 
 
NEW MARKETS AND URBAN SUSTAINABILITY 
While transforming and streamlining the informal sector in the urban South are 
aimed at increasing its viability at the bottom end of the market economy, the issue of 
wasteful practices in the (upper) formal sector of the economy also needs attention. 
Finding the balance between economic, social and environmental sustainability has 
never been easy.  If too much focus is put in policies on economic growth, 
environmental and social activists frown upon it.  If too much focus is placed on 
environmental sustainability, economic growth could be jeopardized to such an extent 
that living standards are compromised.  For this reason three anchors are necessary in 
sustainable development: economic, social and environmental sustainability.  In 1987 
the WCED resolved that:  “Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs and 
aspirations of the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the 
future.  Far from requiring the cessation of economic growth, it recognizes that the 
problems of poverty and underdevelopment cannot be solved unless we have a new 
era of growth in which developing countries play a large role and reap large benefits” 
(Holliday, et al., 2002: 13).   
 
Since the concept of urban ecology has been introduced in California in 1975 
(Roseland, 1997), the concept of urban sustainability has become a potentially 
important factor in the formulation of urban development policy.  Essentially, it deals 
with two issues:  the global decline in supply or availability of natural resources and 
the growing demand for it.  In free market economics, the terms ‘demand’ and ‘need’ 
are often equated with people’s ability or willingness to pay for goods and services, 
i.e. if someone has a desire for a product or service and the ability and willingness to 
pay for it, then effective demand or need has been realized (Heilbroner, 1970; 
Samualson, 1970).  In a train of cause and effect this has led to excessive growth in 
demand in the wealthier parts of the world, which causes the unnecessary expending 
of resources, which in turn leads to an alarming narrowing of the gap between demand 
and supply (see Figure 3), and eventually an increase in waste streams.   
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As a consequence of ‘wasteful’ demand, a distinction is increasingly being 
demanded between the concepts of ‘demand’, ‘needs’ and ‘basic’ or ‘essential needs’ 
(MMSD, 2002).  In sustainable development terms the overall objective is to 
minimize the difference between the latter and the former.  To achieve this goal, a 
number of factors on the demand and the supply side should be addressed.  On the 
demand side, high fertility rates in the South should be reduced, intellectual capacities 
expanded, wasteful consumption world-wide should be minimized, technologies that 
intensify resource consumption should be improved, and the ecological footprint of 
urban settlements in terms of the range and quantities of pollution, wastes, and space 
should be reduced.  On the supply side, the mileage of natural resources should be 
stretched as far as possible, bio-diversities protected, and assimilative capacities 
increased.   
 
An important area of research in the field of urban development lies in how 
economic development can be achieved while minimizing its ecological footprint.   
This shift in focus has been necessitated by the general proclivity of cities (and 
nations) to reduce their potential damaging influence on the local environment by 
importing resources (which cause waste streams and the depletion of resources 
upstream) while exporting locally generated wastes and pollution downstream 
(Haughton, 1997).  In the past, unbridled capitalism often led to cost transfers as a 
means to maximize profits locally, nationally and internationally.  The question could 
be asked how many of the shifts of messy industries from developed to developing 
countries occurred during the period of industrial restructuring, only because of more 
favourable labour economics, and what role easier environmental policies of ‘grow-
first-clean-later’ (Marcotullio, 2001) played in the process.  Eco-sensitive urban 
policies are now being experimented with to attempt to reduce externalities in current 
urban practices.  They range from eco-centric (‘hard’ or ‘deep green’) policies that are 
unsympathetic to economic expansion, to anthropocentric (‘soft’ or ‘light green’) 
policies that are aimed at balancing the need for environmental preservation and 
economic development.   
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been identified (Haughton, 1997): the ‘self-relient’ city, the ‘redesigning’ city, the 
‘externally dependent’ city, and the ‘fair shares’ city policy.  The self-relient city is an 
intrusive deep green approach to city management.  It internalizes economic 
development by emphasizing local economic development within the confines of the 
‘bioregion’ – a region that is economically and politically defined in terms of the 
natural boundaries of ecosystems.  Although application of policies in this group is 
possible at the micro scale, the location of existing cities not conforming to natural 
bioregions, or extending over more than one bioregion, makes application of the 
policy within such a framework difficult, if not impossible.  Also, the distance that is 
created in this model between human activities and natural ecosystems poses a 
difficulty because the human-versus-nature mindset in ecology is rapidly changing.  
As a science, ecology deals with the relationship between organisms and their 
environment, and therefore human activities within the urban environment make 
humans very much part of the ecosystem, economically, socially and biologically 
(Picket, 1997; Jensen, 1998; Parlange, 1998).  The impact of social and economic 
networks inside and between urban nodes and their hinterlands, on the natural 
environment, forms part of the plethora of factors that needs to be taken into account 
when urban economic development policy is considered.      
 
Redesigning city policy refers to approaches that are aimed at reducing resource 
consumption and waste streams.  The objective is to work with nature and to change 
the environmentally damaging practices of people in cities.  One way of achieving 
this is through energy savings by compacting the city.  While some social overhead 
capital savings seem possible in this model, significant savings in transport costs 
ultimately are not guaranteed, since the compacting of cities and the mixing of land 
uses do not necessarily reduce home-to-workplace traveling.  In fact, the densification 
and mixing of land uses may eventually exacerbate traveling problems overall 
because land uses that were concentrated in particular areas previously, potentially 
improving the viability of mass and rapid transit systems, will now be more dispersed 
throughout the city.  From an environmental sustainable point of view, the approach 
also defeats the objective of creating more livable urban space because compacting 
city spaces would necessarily result in increasing person-land ratios.  Ultimately, it 
will reduce open spaces, make cities more ‘urban’, and increase pressure on social 
overhead capital.   Mixing and densifying land uses will also put pressure on personal 
and social space, making it more difficult for people to recuperate psychologically.  
This could ultimately increase tension between individuals and communities within 
cities (Geyer, 2001) – something that we have learned from urban practices in Europe 
during the Industrial Revolution. 
 
Externally dependent city policy is a market-centred approach to environmentally 
sustainable urban development.  It seeks to modify market mechanisms to benefit both 
the environment and the society at large, without necessarily terminally damaging 
market systems.  “Market reform is essential if sustained development is to be 
achieved, but this reform must be geographically sensitized, as well as linked to 
strong social justice programmes and environmental standards setting to ensure that 
both local and global environmental carrying capacities are respected” (Haughton, 
1997: 192).  Based on the classic Kutznets (1955) study that pointed to a possible 
divergence in secular income with economic growth, an underlying understanding of 
this urban model is a Kutznets-like relationship in economic growth and 
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problems are increasingly overcome (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).  An important 
disincentive against the excessive use of resources could be the realistic pricing of 
resources and services.  Of particular interest in this model is how the cost of 
externalities could be built into the marketing mechanism, making polluters pay for 
their actions, especially in cases where wealth expands the locus of environmental 
challenges from local to regional and eventually to global proportions, as has been 
found in Asia (Marcotullio, 2001).  One of the latest developments in this field is the 
generation of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index system (DJSI World), the first 
attempt at benchmarking the financial performance of sustainability of corporations 
on a global basis (Holiday, et al., 2002).  
 
Fair shares city policy contains elements of all three previous categories.  The 
difference lies in how it targets problems of spatial political, environmental, social 
and economic disequilibrium, i.e. what are the needs of people and how to balance the 
benefits of some against the needs of others.  The unequal distribution of resources 
and ways in which to manage the exporting of externalities are important issues in this 




Since the 1970s the industrialized world have experienced significant economic 
changes which changed the production conditions of entrepreneurs.  The economic 
restructuring that followed impacted significantly on the urban environment of both 
the developed and developing world.  The populations of large urban agglomerations 
in the developed world started to stagnate and even decline (Fielding, 1989; Geyer 
and Kontuly, 1996; Geyer, 1996) while new mega cities started to develop in the 
developing world.  In the newly industrializing countries global shifts in 
industrialization have contributed greatly to urban growth there, while rural poverty 
remained an important factor in urban growth in the lagging corners of the world.  In 
the process, global block formation continues to favour developing countries that are 
geographically closer to core regions in the North while the global outer periphery 
remains relatively isolated. 
In the early 1990s a European Commission (EC) identified six factors that are 
expected to have a major impact on the economic potential of cities in the future.  
They are: (i) a diverse economic base, especially in the high value-added sectors, (ii) 
human capital that enables the exploitation of high technology sectors, (iii) 
educational institutions that would provide a steady flow of skilled workers, (iv) a 
high quality of life to attract and retain a highly skilled workforce, (v) good transport 
and communication networks, and (vi) the institutional capacity to exploit potential 
(Alden, 1997).  A key issue that is highlighted in the EC report is the ability of the 
central, regional and local government sectors to form partnerships with the private 
sector and local communities.  These features are rarely seen in the urban South.  
Countries that have attracted industries first during the post-Fordist era often followed 
a develop-first-clean-later approach, while cities in the global outer periphery, such as 
in Africa, simply fall short in all the departments.  It could be said that while 
informationalization occurs in the economies of the urban North and industrializing 
South (Hall, 1996), informalization has been occurring in the economies of the 
lagging urban South. 
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Based on these views, maybe one should accept the fact that the techno-economic 
dichotomy of the developed world and parts of the developing world will not be 
overcome, even in the longer term, unless ways could be found in which local 
economic development in lagging countries could be speeded up.  As long as the gap 
between development conditions in the North and South remains as wide as it 
currently is, focusing intentionally on the vertical integration of the formal and 
informal urban economic sectors in the urban South seems to be one of the methods in 
which the gap could be narrowed.  Recognizing the inherent structure of the informal 
urban sector and narrowing the gap between the upper, technologically more 
sophisticated layer of the informal sector and the formal urban sector is one way of 
making conventional market forces more accessible to the lagging sector of the urban 
South.  In the process lessons that have been learned about the long term affect of 
unsustainable urban economic practices in the industrializing South should be firmly 
kept in mind.  
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